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Summary findings
Canning and Bennathan estimate social rates of return to  par with, or lower than, rates of return  on other forms of
electricity-generating capacity and paved roads, relative  capital. But in a few countries there is evidence of acute
to  the  return  on  general  capital, by examining the  shortages of electricity-generating capacity and paved
effect on aggregate output  and  comparing that  effect  roads and, therefore, excess returns to infrastructure
with  the  costs of construction.  investment.
They find that bot]h  types of infrastructure capital are  Excess returns are evidence of suboptimal investment
highly complementary  with  other  physical capital  and  that, in the case of paved roads, appears to follow a
human  capital,  but  have rapidly  diminishing returns  period of sustained economic growth during which road-
if increased  in isolation.  The  complementarities on  building stocks have lagged behind investments in other
the  one  hand,  and  diminishing returns  on  the  other,  types of capital. This effect is accentuated by the fact that
point  to the existence of an optimal mix of  capital  the relative costs of road construction are lower in
inputs,  making it very easy for a  country to have too  middle-income countries than in poorer and richer
much - or too  little - infrastructure.  For policy  countries.
purposes,  Canning  and  Bennathan  compare  the  rate  As a rule,  a  tendency to  infrastructure  shortages  -
of  return  for investing in  infrastructure  with  the  signaled by higher social rates of return to paved roads
estimated rate  of return  to capital.  or electricity-generating capacity than to other forms of
The strong compleimentarity  between physical and  capital - is symptomatic of certain  income classes of
human capital, and the lower prices of investment goods  developing countries: electricity capacity in the poorest,
in industrial economies, means that the rate of return to  paved roads in the middle-income group.  To the
capital as a whole is just as high in rich countries as in  extent  that  such high rates of  return  are not  detected
the poorest countries but is highest in the middle-income  by microeconomic  cost-benefit analysis, they  suggest
(per capita) countries,.  macroeconomic  externalities  associated  with
In most countries the rates of return to both  infrastructure.
electricity-generating capacity and paved roads are on a
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The construction of infrastructure has traditionally had a large public sector
component. For some kinds of infrastructure, the argument for public provision is that they
represent non-rival public goods, as is the case of rural roads, or a natural monopoly, as is
the case of electricity distribution systems and land-line telephone networks. Public sector
provision, often in the absence of market pricing mechanisms, has led to projects being
evaluated by the methods of cost benefit analysis, as is the practice of the World Bank in
its infrastructure projects.  The average economic rate of return for World Bank projects
evaluated over the period 1983-1992 was 11 percent for electricity projects, and 29 percent
for road building(Wold Bank, 1994). Rates of that order might be described as adequate,
but not exceptional. Where they prevail there is an argument for infrastructure provision,
but no indication of a serious shortage of the infrastructure.
There are, however, a number of well-known problems with rates of return based
on cost benefit analysis. Actual practice of such studies often departs far from the
theoretically correct methodology (Little and Mirrlees (1990)). Even if done correctly,
however, microeconomic cost benefit analysis is likely to miss important benefits of
infrastructure if those occur in the form of extemalities. Transportation infrastructure may
have a profound impact on the extent of the market and the ability of producers to exploit
economies of scale and specialization. Widening the market then brings benefits in terms
of increased competition and contestability in markets.  Transportation infrastructure also
allows greater dissemination of knowledge and technology.  Models incorporating these
ideas are now common in the "new economic geography," and there is increasing
empirical evidence for these effects, see, for example, Krugman (1991, 1996), Borland and
Yang (1992), Krugman and Venables (1995), Kelly (1997), Porter (1998), Gallup, Sachs
and Mellinger (1999), Limao and Venables (1999).
Other infrastructure, such as electricity generating capacity, should be important in
the type of "big push" models of economic development as proposed by Murphy Shleifer
and Vishny (1989). If the takeoff in developing countries relies on a co-ordinated bout of
investment, the public provision of risky, large scale, infrastructure projects may provide a
trigger for private sector investment and escape from a poverty trap.
2These arguments  point to very large  potential  benefits  of infrastructure  which
nevertheless  elude  identification  and  measurement  by conventional  cost-benefit  analysis.
Unless  measured  in a convincing  way, however,  we do not know whether  the size of these
effects  provides  a case  for expanding  infrastructure  beyond  current  levels,  or even  perhaps
for adopting  a policy  of infrastructure-led  development.  This remains  true even  under  the
current  trend of providing  infrastructure  though  the private  sector, or at least  to have some
form of pricing  mechanism. While  public  or private  pricing schemes  can recover at least
in part, the costs of a project,  prices can only capture  private  benefits. If infrastructure  has
large  positive  externalities,  even  under  private  provision  we may wish  to have a policy of
subsidies  to ensure  provision  on an adequate  scale.
Our approach  to finding  the benefits  of infrastructure  is to estimate  an aggregate
production  function  for a panel of countries  over the last 40 years,  including  as explanatory
variables  physical  capital  and  human  capital  as well  as our infrastructure  variables,  paved
roads and electricity  generating  capacity. We can then  calculate  the marginal  product  of
infrastructure  as its contribution  to aggregate  output. While  this approach  misses any
benefits  to infrastructure  that do not appear  in Gross  Domestic  Product  (for example,  time
savings  that lead  to increased  leisure)  it should  allow  us to see if infrastructure  has large
output  effects.
Using aggregate  production  functions  to estimate  the contribution  of infrastructure
has become  quite common  (for example,  Andrews  and Swanson  (1995),  Boarnet (1997),
Carlino  and 'Voith  (1992),  DeFrutos,  GarciaDiez  and  PerezAmaral  (1998),  GarciaMila,
McGuire  and Porter (1996),or  Pinnoi  (1994)).  The  main problem  with estimating  these
function  is reverse  causality. An increase  in income  leads  to increased  demand  for
infrastructure,  and so a positive  correlation  between  infrastructure  stocks  and output levels
may be simply  due to increased  demand,  and  may not reflect any supply  side productivity
effect. To overcome  this problem,  we use the techniques  developed  in Canning  (1999)
based  on a panel data, cointegration,  analysis,  as outlined  in 2.1 below.  One appealing
feature  of our approach  is that the estimates  we get for the productivity  of human  and
physical  capital  are close  to those  found in microeconomic  studies  of their private  rates of
return. This suggests  that the procedure  does indeed  remove  the bias introduced  by reverse
3causality which we suspect to be just as great for investment in physical and human
capital as for infrastructure.
A major difference between the results in this paper and those in Canning (1999) is
that here we base our approach not on a Cobb-Douglas production function but on a trans-
log specification. The Cobb-Douglas production function imposes a declining marginal
product of each type of capital as the capital-labor ratio rises.  This virtually imposes a
finding of a high rate of return to all capital goods in lower-income countries and a low
rate of return in high-income countries, which is greatly at odds with observed private rates
of return on physical and human capital and the pattern of capital flows between countries
(Lucas (1990)).  The trans-log specification, on the other hand, allows for flexibility in the
pattern of rates of return across countries.
A further major reason for adopting this specification is to allow us to examine the
pattern of complementarity and substitutability between inputs into the production
function. We find that each type of infrastructure, on its own, has rapidly diminishing
returns, which implies little support for a policy of purely infrastructure led growth.
However, infrastructure is found to be strongly complementary with both physical and
human capital, giving it an important role in a process of balanced growth and the
possibility of acute infrastructure shortages if investment in other types of capital takes off
but infrastructure investment lags behind.  We explain these relationships in sections 2.2
and 2.3 below. Together with the cost of infrastructure (section 3 below) these productivity
relationships enter into the determination of the social rates of return to infrastructure
(section 4 below).
For many countries, across the whole range of income levels, we estimate rates of
return to infrastructure that are in line with, or actually lower than, those found for physical
capital as a whole. Given the extra costs caused by the distortions involved in raising taxes
to fund public infrastructure projects, this gives little support for a general policy of
increasing infrastructure stocks.
However, the rate of return to infrastructure is found to be highest in countries with
infrastructure shortages, that is low levels of infrastructure relative to their levels of human
4and physical capital, and countries  that have low costs of infrastructure  construction.
Among a subset  of middle income  countries  , we find evidence  of an acute shortages  of
paved roads, coupled  with very low costs of road building.  This generates  exceptionally
high estimated  rates of return to paved road building  in these countries. We find similar
evidence  of high rates of return to electricity  generating  capacity,  but this time mainly in a
subset  of lower  and lower-middle  income  countries.
It should  be emphasized  that for all higher income  countries,  and for the vast
majority  of lower and middle  income  countries,  we find that the estimated  rates of return to
infrastructure  are in line with,  or below,  those for capital  as a whole. High rates of return
to infrastructure  are the exception  rather than  the rule,  making the case for large scale
investment  in infrastructure  depend  on an analysis  of a country's characteristics  rather than
a blanket  prescription  or sector-specific  rules or schemas.
2. The Effect of Infrastructure on Aggregate Output
2.1 Theory
We begin  by examining  the contribution  of infrastructure  to aggregate  production.
The approach  used is to argue  that there is a common  world-wide  production  function
given by
Yit = ai +  bt +  f  (ki, hi, xi,) +  sit  (1)
where  y is log output  per worker,  a is a country  specific  level of total factor productivity,
and b is a time dummy  capturing  world-wide  changes  in total factor  productivity  while k, h
IOur  countxy  groups  are based on World  Bank definitions  measured  in  US Dollar  Purchasing  Power
Parity terms;  Low Incomes  (43 of 123  countries)  have an upper limit  of (1985) $ 1,690  p.c.; Lower  Middle
Income (40 countries)  range from $1,890  to $4,735  p.c.; Upper  Middle  Income  (16 countries,  from
Venezuela  to Romania),  from $4,904  to $6,764  p.c., and 24 High Income  countries  (from  Saudi  Arabia to
Switzerland),  from $6,765  to $17,000  p.c.
5and x represent the log of per worker inputs of physical capital, human capital, and
infrastructure capital respectively. The term  - represents a random error.
By defining everything in per worker terms we rule out economies of scale at the
aggregate level that may in fact be important for measuring the effect of infrastructure
(Morrison and Schwartz (1994)). For simplicity, we include infrastructure as a normal
factor of production, ignoring the possible effects of infrastructure on the long growth rate
of technology and total factor productivity that are examined in Duggal, Saltzman and
Klein (1999).  We also assume random errors in output around our production function,
rather than allow for a stochastic frontier approach as used by Mullen, Williams and
Moonmaw (1996). The motivation for our straightforward approach to the production
function is that it allows us to use techniques that control for reverse causality.  Since it is
reverse causality that is the major issue for the credibility of aggregate production
functions, this seems worthwhile, even if it is at the cost of using a simple functional form.
We allow the production function, f, to take two different forms. Our first
approach is to assume that the underlying production function is Cobb-Douglas, so that, in
logs, we have
f (ki,,hi,xi,)  = aki, + fihi + xit.*  (2)
A second approach is to assume a more complex functional form given by
f (kit, hi,, xit) =a,ki, + fl h +ri xi  +  a2ki2t  + 12 hit +r2  i2t +fkh kit  hit +  ,kxkitxi, + Vr,,h,,x,,.  (3)
This variant of the trans-log production function allows for different degrees of
substitutability and complementarity between the different types of capital. However, by
using capital per worker variables we again impose constant returns to scale and are ruling
out the interaction effects between each type of capital and labor that would appear in a
standard trans-log specification. The larger the number of variables to be estimated, the
6lower will be the precision of our estimates, so that (3) represents a trade-off between a
more general model and the parsimonious specification that one would like to have for
estimation purposes.
A major problem in estimating the production function as set out above is the
potential for reverse causation.  If capital investments depend on income (for example,
through a savings function s;) we can write
A.Kit = Si (Yit  ) - dKi,  (4)
where K is the capital stock, Y is the total GDP, and d is the depreciation rate.  This gives
the steady state relationship
K_  Si  (Yit)  (5
d
This implies a feedback from income to the capital stock, making it difficult to
identify the results of regressions such as (2) or (3) as a production function relationship.
Tlhere  is also obvious potential for a feedback from income to a demand for infrastructure.
If we follow a country through time, output will grow as capital accumulation proceeds,
but capital accumulation will follow income, making it very difficult to establish the causal
links in each direction.  The positive feedback from higher income to greater capital
accumulation in infrastructure might lead us to expect an over- estimation of the
coefficients in a production function regression.
While this problem of reverse causality usually precludes simple direct estimation
of the production function, there are circumstances under which we can estimate a
relationship such as (1) using simple methods. As shown in Canning (1999), each of the
series that appear in (1) are non-stationary.  We can, therefore, think of (1) as a long run
cointegrating relationship. Note however, that in each country, (5) may also be a
cointegrating relationship, holding even when we divide though by the number of workers.
7It follows that when we estimate the "production function" as a cointegrating relationship
we will in practice estimate a mixture of a production function and an investment
relationship. 2
However, in panel data the problem disappears, provided the long run relationship
(1) is homogeneous across countries while the investment relationship (5) differs across
countries.  In a panel we can pool data across countries, and while (1) remains a
cointegrating relationship, when we pool the data and estimate a homogeneous form of
equation (5),
Kit  s(Y)  (6)
d
we find that the error term, due to actual investment behavior in each county being
different from the world average relationship, is given by
=Si  (Y  ) -s(Y)  (7)
d
It follows that the error term in each country is non-stationary, and eventually
becomes very large, because the error produced by using a pooled relationship, rather than
the true country specific relationship, depends on the income level, which is non-
stationary. Even if we have a long run relationship between income and investment for
each country, pooling the data across countries allows us to identify the long run
production function relationship. This argument, of course, depends on the assumption
that our model (1) is correct and holds across countries. It also depends on the relationship
between income and investment being heterogeneous across countries but, as Chari, Kehoe
and McGratten (1996) point out, differences in the security of property rights and tax
policies are likely to produce very different investment rates even for countries at the same
level of income.
2Even  if we adopt Johansen's  (1991)  technique,  which  allows  the estimation  of nmltiple  cointegrating
vectors,  the results  depend  on an arbitrary  normalization  and  provide  a basis for the subspace  spanned  by the
cointegrating  vectors  rather  than  the structural  relationships  themselves.
8If we accept this argument, we can estimate equation (1) consistently by ordinary
least squares (OLS).  However, OLS has poor small sample properties in this framework
and its reported t-values are not appropriate, even asymptotically. BaneriJee  (1999) and
Phillips and Moon (1999) each give an overview of recent techniques for estimating long
run relationships using panel data that overcome these problems.  In this paper we follow
Kao and Chiang (1999) who argue that a dynamic OLS estimator that includes leads and
lags of the first differences of the explanatory variables, has good small sample properties
and gives a method (based on the long run variance co-variance matrix of the innovations
and residuals') of estimating consistent t statistics.
The method used by Kao and Chiang (1999) is appropriate when we estimate a
Cobb-Douglas production function relationship, as in equation (2), since all the variables
appear to be I(1)3, and we postulate that the production function is a cointegrating
relationship 4. However, estimation of the more complex production function (3) is
somewhat more problematic.  The difficulty is that if capital stock and infrastructure
variables are I(1), the higher order squared and cross product terms cannot be I(1).
However, Chang, Park and Phillips (1999) show that estimating non-linear functions of
1(1)  variables does not affect the consistency properties of the standard OLS estimator,
though it does affect the speed of convergence of the estimates5. In addition, while we
report adjusted t-statistics in the same way as for the linear case, it is not clear than these
are asymptotically consistent for the non-linear case. Therefore, while we have a
3 I(1)  means  integrated  of order  one; that  is non-stationary,  but stationary  when  first differenced.  The
tests  for non-stationarity  are reported  in Canning  (1999). Here we use  paved roads  rather  than  paved roads
plus railway  lines  but this  change  makes  little  difference  to the time series  properties  of the series.
4 When estimating  a single  time  series  relationship  with  non-stationary  variables  it is important  to test for
cointegration  because  the time trends  in non-stationary  variables  can lead  to a "spurious"  regression
suggesting  a close  relationship,  when  in fact  none exists. However,  Phillips  and  Moon (1999)  point  out that
this  does not occur  in panel  data,  and we can safely  estimate  long run  relationships  relationships  by OLS,
even  without  cointegration.
5 The speed of convergence  of a parameter  estimate  to the true  parameter  value  depends  on the range of
variation  of the explanatory  variable,  relative  to the variance  of the error term. Non-stationary  variables  tend
to have  much greater  variance  than stationary  variables,  giving  much faster convergence  of parameter
estimates  in cointegrating  relationships  than  in standard  regressions  (so called  "super-consistency").  Our
higher  power  terms exhibit  even an greater  range of values  than I(1)  variables,  indicating  that their  para,meter
estimates  will converge  to the true value  even  more  quickly.
9consistent  estimate  of the parameters  of equation  (3), and regard these as our "best
estimates"  of the long run relationship  between  inputs  and aggregate  output,  we do not
carry out hypothesis  testing of the significance  of the estimates.
2.2 Cobb-Douglas  Production  Function  Estimates
Data for output per worker  and capital  stock  per worker are from the Penn World
Tables  5.6 (see Summers  and Heston, 1991). For output  per worker  we use purchasing
power  parity GDP per worker (chain  index). Our physical  capital  measure  is constructed
using a perpetual  inventory  method;  assuming  a capital-output  ratio of three in the base
year (usually 1950)  we update each  year's capital  stock  by adding  investment  (from  Penn
World Tables 5.6)  and subtracting  7% depreciation  from the previous  year's capital  stock.
Since  our estimation  only starts  in 1960  this gives a reasonable  period of time for our
capital stock  estimates  to lose their dependence  on the arbitrary  initial condition.  The
results of this procedure  for producing  capital  stock  estimates  are remarkably  robust  to
variations  in the initial  choice of capital-output  ratio and the depreciation  rate. Human
capital  per worker  is measured  by the average  years  of schooling  of the workforce,  from
Barro and Lee (1993).
The two infrastructure  stock  variables  used are kilowatts  of electricity  generating
capacity  and the length  of paved roads,  (including  urban  paved roads),  both taken from the
processed  data in Canning  (1998).  These  physical  measures  do not reflect quality
differences  in infrastructure  across  countries  and over time. These differences  may occur
at the time of construction;  roads differ  enormously  in terms  of their capacity  (number  and
width of lanes) and durability. Electricity  generating  capacity  comes  in many forms (e.g.
oil fired, coal fired,  nuclear,  hydroelectric)  with different  construction  costs and  running
costs. In addition,  the effectiveness  of infrastructure  may depend  crucially  on its quality,
both initially  and in terms of maintenance  (see Hulten  (1997)). In particular,  there is
evidence  of wide variation  in the quality  of roads in different  countries  due to different
climatic  conditions,  as well as different  levels  of maintenance  and repair.  The lack of
comprehensive  quality  data means  we use our simple  quantity  measures  in our estimation;
10however, it is worth noting that the fixed effect specification we use to capture cross
country differences in total factor productivity tends to net out any cross-country
infrastructure quality differences that are constant over time.
In table 1 we report the results of our estimates using the Cobb-Douglas
production function.  All regressions in this paper include country specific intercepts and
world-wide  year dummies (which are not reported).  The regressions also include the
value, currerLt,  as well as one lead and one lag, of the growth rate of each capital input per
worker (the first differences of the capital stock variables).  The short-term effects of these
growth rates are estimated separately for each country, to allow for country specific
business cycle multiplier/accelerator effects. Estimating the short -run coefficients
separately for each country uses up a large number of degrees of freedom, but may
improve the small sample properties of the estimators considerably.
The first column reports results for a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
specification including only capital per worker and human capital per worker.  Both
coefficients are statistically significant; they can be interpreted as the elasticity of output
with respect to each input.  The coefficients found are consistent with  what emerged from
the calibration of a Cobb-Douglas model using microeconomic studies on private rates of
return to physical and human capital (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997)). We take that
as indicating  that any externalities to physical and human capital are small on average.  On
the other hand, our results contrast with the finding in some macroeconomic studies of
much higher elasticities, particularly for human capital (e.g. Mankiw  , Romer and Weil
(1992)). However, these earlier studies may be contaminated by a feedback from income
to savings (or savings rates) which biases their estimates upwards; the similarity between
our macroeconomic estimates and those based on micro-evidence on private returns
suggests that our econometric methods have overcome the feedback problem.
When we add electricity generating capacity (column 2 of table 1)we find a
significant, positive, coefficient.  Since electricity generating capacity is already included
in total capital, we have a double counting problem in interpreting regression 2: an increase
in electricity generating capacity will have two effects, increasing the capital stock as well
as the stock of generating capacity.  The coefficient on log electricity generating capacity
11can be thought of as the effect of increasing generating capacity while holding capital stock
constant; that is, it is the effect of diverting resources from other types of capital to
investment in generating capacity. As shown in Canning (1999), a positive coefficient
implies a gain in output from shifting resources to generating capacity, provided that the
reallocation is carried out at world average prices.  In general, therefore, a positive
coefficient on generating capacity implies a higher rate of return to generating capacity
than that for other types of physical capital, though this may not hold in countries where
the cost of generating capacity is relatively high compared with that of other types of
capital.
We find a similar result for paved roads, (column 3 of table 1), suggesting that
paved roads have, in general, higher rates of return than other types of capital.  These
positive results retain their statistical significance when we add both types of infrastructure
together ( column 4 of table 1).
The result that paved roads and electricity generating capacity have higher returns
than found for capital in general is at odds with the results reported in Canning (1999),
where no evidence of significant excess returns was found.  One difference between the
two studies is that here we use paved roads instead of transport routes (which include
railway line length).  In addition, we drop Singapore and Hong Kong from the roads
sample.  These city states have very high incomes, despite having very low road lengths,
and including them in the data set tends to produce a much lower estimate for the effects of
roads, since they suggest that roads are not required to generate a high income level.  We
remove them from our estimation when we include paved roads as an explanatory variable
on the grounds that as city states their unusual geography, in particular their high
population densities, make them unrepresentative of the development process.
However, the main difference between the two studies is that in this paper, when
estimating the effect of paved roads and electricity generating capacity on output, we do
not include telephones as an extra explanatory variable.  The difficulty with including
telephones in the regressions is that it has a very large estimated coefficient, and tends to
swamp the effect of the other variables. The large coefficient would still not justify
exclusion if it were a true reflection of the productivity of telephones, but the estimated
12productivity effects are implausibly large (giving rates of return of over 10,000% per year)
and may well reflect the fact that the number of telephones is to a greater extent more
demand determined than the other types of infrastructure we are considering. 6 To avoid
this difficulty we exclude telephones from our inputs in this study.
We could use the result in table 1 to compute the marginal product, and rate of
retum, to infrastructure.  However, the Cobb-Douglas production function imposes the
assumption of a constant elasticity of output with respect to each type of input and ignores
the possibility that the elasticity may vary across countries. In table 2 we report the result
of splitting the sample into two equal sub-samples, based on each country's  income per
worker in 1975.7 We find that the coefficients on the infrastructure terms in poorer
countries are very small, and statistically insignificant, but that they remain large, and
significant, in richer countries.  This implies that infrastructure in the poorer countries
appears to have the same effectiveness in raising output as other types of physical capital,
while having a greater effectiveness than other types of capital in richer countries.
2.3  Trans-Log Production Function Estimates
We can investigate the production function relationship in greater detail by
adopting the more complex trans-log style of production function set out in equation (3).
The results of these trans-log regressions are shown in table 3.  In the first column we
report results for capital and human capital on their own.  In column 2 we add electricity
generating capacity while in column 3 we add paved roads.  In all three regressions we add
6 Formlly,  the problem may be that the feedback  from income  level  to the number of telephones is fairly
homogeneous across countries, so that this is what our estimation procedure picks up, while the institutional
structures of roads building and installing electricity generating capacity are more varied across countries,
and so do not bias our results.
7 Splitting the sample on the basis of income tends to bias the results slightly because of the correlation
between sample selection and the disturbance terms. However, table 2 is intended for illustration purposes
only and is not used in calculating rates of return.
13short run adjustment terms including current, lagged, and a lead of each capital stocks
growth rate, again estimated separately for each country. 8
In the trans-log specification the important points are the size and sign of the higher
power terms. In our base specification (column 1), the squared term in capital is positive.
The elasticity of output with respect to capital is, therefore, rising, giving capital a greater
effectiveness in countries that already have a great deal of it.  On the other hand, the
squared term for human capital is negative, implying rapidly diminishing returns to
investment in human capital.  The interaction effect between human capital and physical
capital in column 1 is positive, suggesting that the two are complements, which is
consistent with the complementarity between capital and skilled labor found by Bemdt and
Christensen (1974).
In column 2 of table 3 we add electricity generating capacity, EGC, to the
specification. The squared term in EGC is negative, indicating rapidly diminishing returns
to investment in electricity taken in isolation. However, the interactive terms between
electricity and physical capital, and electricity and human capital, are both positive.  This
implies that electricity generating capacity is complementary to, physical and human
capital, with its effectiveness increasing in their presence. Since we measure the various
capital stocks each per worker, the effectiveness of EGC is found to be rising with capital
deepening.
We find the same pattern for paved roads, with the squared term in roads being
negative, but both interaction terms, between roads and the other forms of capital, being
positive.  These results, for both kinds of infrastructure, indicate that infrastructure
investments are not sufficient by themselves to induce large changes in output. However,
infrastructure can be a productive investment in economies with high levels of physical
8 As noted above,  it is unclear  we should  put much weight  on the estimated  t statistics  in table 3 because
of the non-linearities  in the specification.  In addition,  it should  be noted that  the large  increase  in the R
squared  between  table 1 and  table 3 is an artifact  of the fact  that in table 3 we include  in the R squared  the
explanatory  power  of the country  specific  fixed  effects and  the worldwide  time trend,  while in tables 1  and 2
these  effects  are removed  from  the data before  estimation.
14and human capital, and infrastructure itself, in turn, raises the productivity of investment in
those other types of capital.
A clearer picture emerges from calculating the elasticity of output with respect to
each capital input.  Since the elasticities vary with the amount of each input, we begin by
doing this for three fictitious countries, one with median inputs of physical capital, and
human capital and infrastructure per worker, one with each input at the lower quartile and
one with each input at the upper quartile. The results, using input measures taken in 1985,
are reported in table 4.  Notice that, in general, the actual country with median amount of
physical capital in that year will not be the one with median levels of human capital or
infrastructure.  The table therefore does not represent elasticities in actual countries but in
the hypothetical ones that we construct to represent an average, a moderately poor, and a
moderately rich country.
For physical capital we find a consistent pattern of rising elasticities. Based on the
results in column 1 of table 3, we find that the elasticity of output with respect to capital
would be 0.5 for a country at the first quartile in terms of its input levels of human and
physical capital, rising to 0.65 in a country that was at the third quartile.  On the other
hand, the elasticity of output with respect to human capital is fairly steady as we change
input levels.  I'urning to the regressions that include our infrastructure variables we find
that the elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure seems to be higher in middle
income countries, that have input levels per capita around the world median, than in
countries with higher or lower input levels.  This reflects the fact that infrastructure in
middle income countries benefits from the presence of complementary inputs in the form
of physical and human capital, but is not yet extensive enough to have entered the phase of
rapidly diminishing returns (reflected in the negative coefficients on infrastructure squared
in table 3).
In figures 1 through 4 we plot the elasticities of output with respect to each input,
estimated using each country's actual input mix in 1985, and plot the result against its
income per capita (at purchasing power parity, from the Penn World tables) in that year.
Figures 1 and 2 are based on regression 1 in table 3.  Figure 1, for the elasticity of output
with respect to physical capital, tells the same story as table 4, with poorer countries
15having low elasticities while richer countries (with higher levels of input per worker) have
high elasticities. For education, shown in figure 2, there is some evidence of a U shaped
relationship with elasticities higher in poorer and richer countries and lower in middle
income countries.  However, the non-linearity in the relationship is not statistically
significant.
Adding together the elasticities of output with respect to these two types of capital
produces a figure that rises with income, and is close to 0.9 in the most developed
countries.  This implies that while we have diminishing returns to capital as a whole over
the entire income range, these diminishing return may occur very slowly in developed
countries.  If this is so, then the developed world may have self sustaining "endogenous
growth" while developing countries live in a neoclassical paradigm.
Figures 3 and 4 (based on regressions 2 and 3 of table 3 respectively) plot the
estimated elasticity of output with respect to our two kinds of infrastructure, in each
country against that country's income per capita in 1985. In both cases we see an inverted
U shape, with elasticities being higher in middle income countries and somewhat lower in
the poor and rich extremes of the income distribution.  It is notable that in figures 3 and 4
we find a relatively large number of countries that have negative elasticities of output with
respect to paved roads or electricity generating capacity. This does not imply that adding to
the stock of these types of infrastructure reduces output; as before, the elasticities refer to
the effect of adding to the stock of infrastructure while holding total capital constant.  That
is, we have the effect of diverting spending away from other physical capital and into the
relevant infrastructure; the negative coefficient therefore means that infrastructure
spending is less productive than spending on other types of capital (at world prices).
This heterogeneity in the response of output to increases in infrastructure, holding
the total capital stock constant, agrees with the results found in Canning and Pedroni
(1999) who use a different technique to estimate the sign of this elasticity on a country by
country basis.  It is notable that in both figures 3 and 4 the heterogeneity of the estimated
elasticities is higher for the lower income countries than for the higher income countries.
Variations in the elasticity are caused by differences in the relative proportions of physical
capital, human capital and infrastructure capital across countries, so that the greater
16heterogeneity  implies  that the mix of capital  varies  more among  the less developed
countries. We see this as a characteristic  of countries  in the process of development,  that
they are in general further  from the optimal  mix of capital  than the richer countries  (or  just
the mix characteristic  of developed  countries),  though  the way in which the mix varies
differs  between  countries.
The production  function  estimates  allow  us to calculate  the impact  of infrastructure
investment  on output,  and indeed  also the marginal  product  of infrastructure. To calculate
rates of return, however,  we need  data on construction  costs.
3. The Cost of Infrastructure
3.1 Measuring  the Cost of Infrastructure
Cost data on infrastructure  investment  are relatively  scarce.  Our two main sources
are electricity  generating  capacity  costs from the World  Bank study  by Moore  and Smith
(1990) and the cost of constructing  transportation  routes from the United  Nations
International  Comparison  Project  (ICP). In addition  we compared  the cost of constructing
transport  routes from the ICP with data from World  Bank  projects.
There are several  difficulties  involved  in measuring  the cost of constructing
infrastructure  to go along  side our physical  measures  of infrastructure  stocks.  One
fundamental  problem  with comparing  data across  countries  is differences  in the type and
quality of the infrastructure  being built. For electricity  generating  capacity  the figures  give
averages  over many different  types  of capacity  that may reflect different  combinations  of
capital  and running  costs.
In theory,  the ICP data for the cost of construction  of transport  routes are for a
common  basket of goods and so should  adjust for quality differences. However  in practice
the adjustment  may not be complete. Our World Bank  project data are superior  in that
they measure  road building costs (rather  than transport  routes in general)  but they are not
adjusted  for road quality. For these projects  we count  kilometers  of road, not lane
kilometers,  nor can we distinguish  between  roads according  to the strength  of the surface
17or the width of the lane. A kilometer added in a high-middle-income country is likely to be
of higher quality than a kilometer in a low-income country, which may introduce a
systematic bias into the data. In addition, the coverage of the ICP data set is much broader
than that from World Bank projects and in what follows we rely exclusively on the ICP
data though it is worth noting that the ICP and World Bank data, when we have data on
both, are in broad agreement.
There is the additional problem for paved roads that our cost figures refer
exclusively to construction, without any allowance for the cost of the land. Land costs are
one reason why Hong Kong and Singapore are such outliers in terms of their road stocks:
not only is the productivity of transport systems likely to be different in such a densely
populated environment, but these city states also have notoriously high land costs.
As with cost benefit analysis, the cost of infrastructure construction we use should
be the real resource cost.  However, our data are actual costs, including any price
distortions caused by the tax system or import controls. If we were to take the view that
most of the cross country differences in infrastructure projects are due to such distortions,
it would be appropriate to take a common world cost for each type of infrastructure as its
real resource cost.  On that view, the elasticity results in table 4, and in figures 1 to 4,
would indicate whether there is an excess return to paved roads over and above that found
for other forms of capital.  However, while this type of assumption may be appropriate for
internationally traded goods, infrastructure projects often involve large scale labor inputs in
the country concerned. This makes the real resource cost depend on the productivity of
labor in other employment, which can vary dramatically across countries. In what follows
we use the actual costs as indicative of the real resource cost.
A problem specific to our data on the cost of electricity generating capacity is that
these are measured in US Dollars while our marginal productivities are measured in
constant international (ICP)dollars. The value of the international dollar is normalized so
that the GDP of the United States is the same in either unit. However, in other countries
the two are not equivalent. In poorer countries, where prices (measured at the nominal
exchange rate) tend to be lower than in the U.S., the real purchasing power of a U.S. dollar,
and so the real resource costs of spending on infrastructure, is high.  Before carrying out
18our rate of return calculations we therefore convert our costs from U.S. Dollars to
international dollars by dividing through by the country's  1985 price level (its purchasing
power parity exchange rate divided by its nominal exchange rate) taken from Summers and
Heston (1991).
3.2 Exploring the Data
Table 5 reports our data on costs by country.  We take 1985 as base year for
comparisons because this gives us a fairly wide range of data in nearby years that can be
deflated to 1985 values.  Column (1) of table 5 gives data on the cost of construction of
transport routes from the 1985 International Comparison Project.  These price indices
represent the nominal price of a basket of transport routes deflated by the country's
purchasing power parity price level.  The indices have been converted in a dollar cost per
kilometer of paved road by taking a figure of $627,580 for the U.S.A.. While transport
routes are a more general category of infrastructure than paved roads, roads make up a
large component of transport routes and these figures do reflect the price of a common
basket of routes which tends to lessen the problem of measuring costs for different
infrastructure qualities.  For a small number of countries we also have data on the cost of
road construction from World Bank projects.  These data are roughly in line with those
from the International Comparison Project but more vulnerable to differences in road
quality between countries.
Summers and Heston (1991) show that there is a tendency for capital goods to be
relatively more expensive in developing countries than developed countries. When we plot
the data on the cost of transport routes in figure 5 we see some evidence of a U- shaped
relationship, with costs being high in the poorer developing and in the developed countries,
but substantially lower in middle income countries. Regressing log cost on log income per
capita and the square of log income per capita gives the result
LogCostperkm=  25.9  -3.517logy  +0.226  (logy)2 (8)
(4.66)  (2.59)  (2.76)
N= 53, R2 = 0.26
19This gives a minimum cost at an annual income level of around $2,300 (in 1985
International Dollars) per capita, which lies in the bottom half of the income range spanned
by the 40 countries classified as lower-middle income in 1985 by the World Bank.  The
World Bank data on costs of paved road construction give a similar picture of U shaped
costs.  In our calculations of rates of return we use the larger data set based on the cost data
we have calibrated from the ICP costs of route construction.
One reason for this U shaped cost structure would be that middle income countries
have lower labor costs than developed countries, but also more of the skills and industry
required to produce construction materials and equipment than the majority of the low-
income countries. Where road construction and paving depend on importing equipment
and even raw materials, costs in the poorer countries can rise to levels found in
industrialized countries.
Our cost data for electricity generating capacity come from Moore and Smith
(1990). Cost, in US dollars, per kilowatt of electricity generating capacity and the
corresponding extension of transmission and distribution, in 1989 is shown in column (2)
of table 5.  The figures are deflated to 1985 values using the GDP deflator and then
converted to International Dollars, using the country's purchasing power parity price level,
before being employed in our rate of return calculations. These figures are reported in
column (3) of table 5.
Looking at the costs in US Dollars, there is clearly an outlier: Senegal has
construction costs in excess of US$13,000 per kilowatt, which is substantially higher than
for any other country. In fact, the next two most expensive countries, also in Africa, are
Niger and Mozambique, with costs that are about half those found in Senegal.  However,
when we look at the costs in international dollars we find high real costs of generating
capacity in many developing countries due to their low price levels relative to their
exchange rate.  The relative consistency of prices at nominal exchange rates suggests that
developing countries are not, in general, able to exploit their low wage costs to achieve low
costs of installing electricity generating capacity.
20Once again there is evidence that the cost of installing electricity generating
capacity falls with the level of income. A regression of log cost per kilowatt of capacity on
log income per capita (both in international dollars) gives the result
LogCostperkW.=  11.18 - 0.287  log  y  (9)
(16.4)  (3.58)
N=63 R2 =0.061
t statistics in parenthesis
For both electricity generating capacity and paved roads the difference in
construction costs between the cheapest and most expensive countries is a factor of almost
10, while cost differences on the order of a factor of 3 are not unusual. Cost differentials
are therefore likely to play an important role in determining rates of return to infrastructure
investment.
4. The Rate of Return  to Infrastructure
4.1 Rate of Return  estimates  and Infrastructure  Policy
The rationale for our approach is that there may be externalities to infrastructure
projects that are not caught in micro-economic cost benefit studies.  The inclusion of these
externalities potentially allows us to capture the total social rate of return to infrastructure.
There are, however, a number of caveats that must be borne in mind when looking at our
results.
Firstly, our approach is to look at the impact of infrastructure on aggregate output
as measured by GDP. This measure of aggregate output has the potential to capture some
of the externalities that microeconomic cost-benefit analysis may miss, it yet has
conceptual drawbacks of its own. For example, cost-benefit analysis can estimate the
travel time saved by a road project and calculate the value of this time.  An analysis using
aggregate output will only pick up the time saved if it is devoted to productive uses, time
21saved that is spent in leisure activities will not be accounted for. In addition, as
Haughwout (1998) points out, an analysis which relies on aggregate output may neglect
relative price effects of infrastructure construction that can have a significant welfare
impact.
A second problem is that our estimate of the effect of infrastructure on output is its
long run steady state effect.  In calculating rates of return we assume that this long-run
effect occurs immediately, and lasts for ever, and we depreciate infrastructure stocks at 7
percent  a year to allow for the cost of maintaining the infrastructure in the long run.  This
creates a difficulty because, when calculating rates of return, the discounting of future
flows means that returns in the early years tend to dominate the calculations.  It follows
that, if it takes several years for infrastructure to reach its full potential, we may be
overestimating its rate of return.  However, a similar consideration applies to our estimates
of the rate of return to private capital, so that when we compare infrastructure rates of
return to those found on general capital, we might expect both to be overestimated in
similar proportions.  While both are probably overestimates, the problem may be worse for
infrastructure where there is considerable evidence that construction may sometimes lead
demand for infrastructure services, either due to its "lumpy" nature, or to over-optimistic
demand projections (World Bank (1994)).
Our macroeconomic estimates of the rate of return to infrastructure also ignore any
"crowding in" effects that it may have on other types of capital.  While an increase in
infrastructure raises the return to other forms of capital, and can lead to an increase in
investment, with consequent effects on output and economic growth, these induced
changes in investment may have only a very small impact on welfare.  As Baldwin (1992)
points out, if the marginal product of capital is close to the rate of discount, the marginal
benefit and marginal cost of extra investment are roughly the same, implying little or no
gain in welfare from the extra investment. 9
9 This is simply an application of the envelope theorem.
22However, there are two cases in which this negative result does not hold. If, instead
of a small increase in infrastructure, we are analyzing a large change, then marginal
analysis is no longer appropriate, since the new infrastructure may raise the marginal
product of capital substantially above the discount rate. Alternatively, if we have reason to
believe that the marginal product of capital already exceeds the discount rate, owing, for
example, to a tax wedge, induced increases in investment can have large welfare effects.
In our calculation we ignore any "crowding in" effect, implicitly assuming that we are
analyzing relatively small infrastructure projects and that the existing allocation of
resources to other forms of capital is reasonably efficient (though we do in fact present
evidence that in some countries the rate of return to capital is considerably in excess of any
reasonable discount rate).
There are also several caveats about the use of our rate of return estimates for
policy purposes. First of all, for evidence of externalities to infrastructure to emerge, we
have to subtract from our figures the private returns to infrastructure projects.  Only if all
the returns to infrastructure captured in cost benefit analysis are private benefits  (and none
externalities)would we arrive at a measure of externalities by subtracting those benefits
that are measured in aggregate GDP (private benefits not measured in GDP should be
added to aggregate productivity estimates to find social rates of return).
However, it is not clear that we ought to focus on externalities: when the
government is the main supplier of infrastructure there is no presumption that it will be
setting infrastructure at the optimal level in terms of private benefits.  There may be capital
misallocation in infrastructure even without externalities. Instead, we shall focus on the
rate of return to infrastructure relative to that on other forms of capital.  Where this ratio
exceeds one, there is a case for arguing that there should be a reallocation of resources to
infrastructure.
Note that this is somewhat different from the normal cost-benefit approach which
looks at the rate of return to a project in relation to a threshold level that is set by the cost
of funds.  We find that, in many countries, the rate of return to capital as a whole appears
to be considerably higher than the commonly used threshold levels (or test discount rates).
In this case there is an argument for encouraging investment in general, and in particular,
23for removing any distortions that are keeping investment rates low.  However, if the rate of
return to infrastructure, while high, is lower than that for other capital, the optimal policy is
to encourage investment in capital other than infrastructure. Infrastructure investment in
those circumstances is very much a second best policy, and would depend on an argument
that investments in other types of capital are not feasible for some reason.
4.2 Calculating Rates of Return
In order to estimate the marginal product of infrastructure we must take account of
the fact that it appears twice in our production function, once on its own in the form of X,
but also as a part of aggregate capital, K.  Let Z be non-infrastructure capital, then we can
write
Kit = ZitP  +XitP-  (10)
Pk
The aggregate capital stock is the value of total capital (we sum the volume of each
type of capital times its price) divided by the price of capital.  To construct these volume
measures we use world prices of investment goods; all prices are expressed relative to
output, which is taken to be the numeraire. For simplicity, we use the approximation
PZ = Pk,  taking the price of non-infrastructure capital as equal to the price of capital as a
whole. Given that infrastructure capital is a relatively small component of the total capital
stock (certainly less than 20% of the total in each case), this approximation seems
reasonable.
Using equation (3) it is easy to derive the country and time specific elasticities
ek =a1 +2a2kit  +  hhit +  kXit  (1 1)
e. _=  y, + 2y2kit  +  y'ikkit + tVfhhit  (12)
The elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure that we estimate is actually
the elasticity found when increasing infrastructure but holding aggregate capital (including
infrastructure) constant. It can therefore be interpreted as the result of diverting a unit of
24physical capital from other purposes to infrastructure. From these elasticities, and the
definition (10), we can calculate the marginal products of a unit of physical and
infrastructure capital - MPK and MPX respectively - as
MPKi, =ek-  MPXit=  MPKit Px + e.-*  (13) Kit  pk  xit
Note that the marginal product of infrastructure consists of two terms, the first
representing the effect of infrastructure on aggregate capital and a second, representing the
distinctive infiastructure effect.
These equations for marginal productivity highlight an important feature of using
aggregate data.  To find the marginal product per dollar spent on an input, the estimated
elasticity must be multiplied by the ratio of output to the stock of the relevant capital, each
measured in dollar tenns.  For capital as a whole this ratio is quite small (typically less
than one third) but for sub-categories of capital this ratio may be large.  Multiplying the
estimated elasticities by a large number also multiplies up any errors in estimation.
It follows that this method is unlikely to be good for determining the marginal
product of small components of the capital stock.  Paved roads and electricity generating
capacity, valued at replacement cost, each make up around 20% of the capital stock on
average, implying that they should have observable effects on aggregate output. Not so,
however, telephone main lines which make up less than 2 percent of the capital stock by
value. For reasons stated in 2.2 above, we omitted telephone main lines from our analysis.
A further reason for that decision is their low share in the total capital stock. We would,
therefore, expect to see them have only a small effect on aggregate output . And to find
their marginal product, we would have to multiply a badly estimated elasticity by a huge
number (the ratio of output to the value of the telephone stock) .
The marginal products measure the output effect of an extra unit of capital.  In the
case of infrastructure this is the marginal product of an extra kilowatt of electricity
generating capacity or an extra kilometer of paved road.  To find the rates of return, we
need the information on the cost of a unit of capital, its marginal product, and its rate of
depreciation. We take the price of investment goods from the Penn World Tables (Mark
256.5) as the price of capital goods and measure both marginal products and costs in a
common unit, 1985 international dollars.
Formally, we can find the rates of return to infrastructure type x in country i,
given by ri.  by solving for the internal rate of return in the formula
E  MPX  -dp  (14)
The left hand side of this equation is the discounted flow of benefits from a unit of
infrastructure, minus depreciation (or maintenance costs) which occur at a rate d per unit of
infrastructure per year.  The right hand side represents the cost of the unit of infrastructure.
Assuming that the marginal product of infrastructure, and the price at which depreciation is
replaced (or maintenance costs), Pix,t  are constant over time, and taking a depreciation rate
of 7 percent per annum 10, equation (14) simplifies to
MPX  -0.07.  (15)
Pix
An equivalent simple formula holds for the rate of return to capital as a whole.
In the following two sections we use these equations to estimate the rate of return
to electricity generating capacity and paved roads.  It is, nevertheless, worth noting that if
the relative price of capital and infrastructure are the same in every country, equation (15)
simplifies to
'0The simple  path of initial  expenditure,  followed  by positive  returns  to the project, ensures  the existence
of a unique internal rate of return for the project.  The result is exactly the same if, instead of replacing
depreciation as it occurs, we assume that we let the capital stock decay to zero over time with proportional
reductions in the benefits of the project.
26rgX=rLk+eX  it.(6
r.  -- ~~ rik  + ex  yi,  (16)
In this case the infrastructure has an excess return over and above that found for
capital in general if and only if it has a positive elasticity as given by equation (12).  As
pointed out by Prittchett (1996), however, and as is also evident in our data, the relative
prices vary enormously across countries.  We should therefore use equation (15) based on
our two stage procedure of estimating the marginal product of a physical unit of
infrastructure and then relating this to its price. We could still use equation (16) and figures
3 and 4 to indicate the pattern of the sign of excess social returns to infrastructure, so long
as we were to believe that our cost data reflect rents and distortions while the real resource
costs of infrastructure relative to other forms of capital are roughly constant across the
world. However, it what follows we shall concentrate on the rates of return using actual
cost data for the construction of infrastructure. Estimates based on this approach  are
reported in tables  6 and 7. All data refer to 1985.
4.3 Estimates of the Rate of Return to Electricity Generating Capacity
Table 6 reports the estimated rate of return to electricity generating capacity,
physical capital in general, and the ratio between the two rates of return in all countries for
which we have the necessary data. The elasticity estimates that underlie these calculations
-- that is the elasticities of  both electricity generating capacity and capital in general --
come from regression (2) in table 3. There are a wide range of rate of return estimates,
from well in excess of 100% a year ( in 1985, for Bangladesh, Kenya, Bolivia and China,)
to quite low figures ( Brazil and Zimbabwe,) and even a negative rate of return for
Mozambique. Note that a small negative rate of return does not imply that infrastructure
does not benefit output, only that its benefits do not cover the costs of depreciation or
maintenance.
One might simply use these rates of return to indicate whether or not investment in
electricity generating capacity was a good use of funds.  However, the real issue being the
allocation of investment between projects, it is more relevant to compare the estimated rate
27of return to electricity generating cap4city with that of physical capital in general. The rate
of return to capital (again based on regression (2) of table 3) is reported in column (2) of
table 6 while column (3) gives the ratio of the rate of return on electricity generating
capacity to the rate of return on capital in general.  This ratio takes on a wide range of
values.  In figure 7 we plot the estimated ratio of rates of return against log income (in
purchasing power parity terms) per capita in 1985. There is a clear downward trend in the
relationship; the poorer countries, on average, have much higher rates of return for
electricity generating capacity than for other capital, while the middle income countries
show rates of return to electricity generating capacity that are roughly the same as for
capital in general. Unfortunately, our cost data are all for developing countries so that we
cannot see how the relationships changes as one moves to high-income levels .
Just as the average rate of return is higher in the poorer countries than in middle
income countries, the variation in the rate of return to electricity generating capacity as
seen in figure 7 is also greater in the poorer countries.  High rates of return in the poorer
countries are based on low stocks of electricity generating capacity relative to the stocks of
complementary inputs, that is, physical and human capital. A line is drawn across figure 7
at a ratio of one; at this point the returns to infrastructure are equal to those on capital in
general. As we can see, it appears to be quite possible for a developing country to have a
excessive investment in electricity generating capacity, relative to its stocks of other
physical capital and of human capital, driving its rate of return down below that on other
forns  of capital.
On average, therefore, we find a tendency for returns to electricity generating
capacity in the poorer developing countries to exceed the returns to other forms of capital.
The heterogeneity of the rates of return in the poorer countries suggests independently that
these countries tend to be further from an optimal mix of investment than middle, or
higher, income countries, perhaps reflecting greater market failure, possibly externalities,
or state failure, and thus prime issues for country analysis.
284.4 Estimates of the Rate of Return to Paved Roads
Our cost data for paved roads cover a wider incomes span of countries, especially
high-income countries, than those for electricity generating capacity. The first column of
table 7 reports the rates of return to paved roads, based on regression 3 of table 3. For
some developing countries (in 1985, notably South Korea, Colombia, Bolivia and the
Philippines) we find exceptionally high rates of return to paved roads.  In some others,
(such as Tunisia and Botswana, again in 1985), rates of return are low. Low rates of return
are also found in most developed countries, with negative returns being present in Austria
and Australia.
Rates of return to capital (this time based on the productivity effects from the same
regression 3 of table 3) are reported in column 2 of table 7.  These estimated rates of return
show much less variation than those for paved roads, partly, no doubt, because of the much
larger value of the total capital stock which makes for  greater accuracy  in the
macroeconomic estimates of the marginal product .
In figure 7 we plot the estimated ratio of the rate of return to paved roads to that
found on capital in general in each country, against the country's  log income per capita.
The first point to note is that in most countries, notably in all the developed and high-
income countries, but also  in the poorer developing countries, the ratio is less than one.  In
these countries the rate of return to paved roads is lower than that on capital in general .
However, in a group of middle income countries the ratio exceeds one by a long way.
These countries get the benefit of a high marginal product of roads coupled with a low cost
of road building.  However, even among middle income countries the rates of return to
roads are sometimes  lower than the rates of return to capital as a whole.
Once again we find a great deal of heterogeneity across countries in rates of return
to paved roads relative to other forms of capital, and once again the heterogeneity is
greatest among the low-to upper- middle income countries. However, if we are looking for
high rates of return to investment in paved roads, it is in that very class of middle-income
countries that we have to look.
294.5 The Rate of Return to Capital
The rate of return to capital as a whole has been used extensively in the last two
sections as a benchmark by which to judge the attractiveness of infrastructure investment.
We now take the rate of return to capital on its own, basing our estimates on  regression 1 (
with  physical and human capital as the only independent variables) in table 3.  Plotting
this in fig.9 against log income per capita  for a cross section of countries in 1985 we
obtain,  a graph with an inverted U shape. The highest rate of return is  found in middle
income countries; and  the maximum  on the curve corresponds to an income per capita of
$3,600 (international dollars) which is in the top half of the 1985 lower-middle income
class. This result contrasts starkly with the very steeply downward sloping graph for the
rate of return to capital that we obtain from a Cobb-Douglas specification.
The relationship we find is consistent with the observation that actual private
returns to capital are quite low in the poorer developing countries and that capital does not
flow from the rich to the poor (see Lucas (1990)) but rather to middle-income countries. In
developed countries, diminishing returns to capital set in quite slowly because they can
keep their marginal productivity of capital up by having large amounts of human capital.
We nevertheless find some evidence that returns to capital are higher in middle income
developing than in the developed (industrialized) countries, a finding that makes the very
high relative returns to paved roads even more interesting.
5. Conclusion
The use of an aggregate production function allows us to calculate rates of return to
infrastructure that should capture any externalities that escape microeconomic cost-benefit
studies. The model could be improved upon, in particular by estimating a more general
production function, including, for example, the effects of industrial structure and
geography on the productivity of infrastructure.
30Though our results depend on a number of simplifying assumptions, they appear
plausible. They suggest that as a rule, infrastructure shortages, signaled by high social rates
of return to electricity generating capacity or paved roads, relative to other capital, are
symptomatic of  limited groups of countries identified by the income per capita class that
they belong to, essentially the lower-middle and upper-middle income classes of
developing countries.  To the extent that such high rates of return are not detected by a
microeconomic cost-benefit analysis, they point to macroeconomic externalities associated
with infrastructure.
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33Table 1. The Cobb Douglas  Production  Function  with Infrastructure
Dependent Variable: Log GDP per Worker 1960-1990
Total Factor Productivity  Year  Year  Year  Year
Dummies,  Dummies,  Dummies,  Dummies,
Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects
Short Run Dynamics  2 lags, 1 lead  2 lags, 1 lead  2 lags, 1 lead  2 lags, 1 lead
Log Capital per Worker  0.455  0.404  0.417  0.392
(14.7)  (14.6)  (11.7)  (11.9)
Log Human Capital per  0.125  0.051  0.079  0.059
Worker  (3.73)  (1.43)  (1.77)  (1.54)
Log Electricity  0.085  0.057
Generating Capacity per  (5.83)  (3.13)
Worker
Log Paved Roads per  0.083  0.048
Worker  (4.06)  (2.30)
R squared adjusted  0.729  0.678  0.716  0.685
Countries  97  90  67  62
Observations  2674  2473  1671  1534
Average T  28  27  25  25
t ratios in parentheses are calculated based on the long run auto-covariance matrix and are
asymptotically N(0,  1).
34Table 2. The Cobb Douglas  Production  Function  with Infrastructure
In Low Income and High Income  Countries
Dependent Variable: Log GDP per Worker 1960-1990
Low Income  High Income
Full Sample  Countries  Countries
Total Factor  Year Dummies,  Year Dummies,  Year Dummies,
Productivity  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects
Short Run  2 lags, 1 lead  2 lags, 1 lead  2 lags, 1 lead
Dynamics
Log Capital per  0.392  0.371  0.365
Worker  (11.9)  (8.58)  (6.41)
Log Human Capital  0.059  0.035  0.112
per Worker  (1.54)  (0.64)  (1.57)
Log Electricity  0.057  0.012  0.117
Generating Capacity  (3.13)  (0.50)  (3.73)
per Worker
Log Paved Roads  0.048  0.003  0.134
per Worker  (2.30)  (0.12)  (4.05)
R squared adjusted  0.685  0.582  0.478
Countries  62  31  31
Observations  1534  781  753
Average T  25  25  24
t ratios in parentheses are calculated based on the long run auto-covariance matrix and are
asymptotically N(0, 1).
Sample split on the basis of income per capita in 1975
35Table  3. The Translog  Production  Function  with Infrastructure
Dependent Variable: Output per Worker
Regression  (1)  (2)  (3)
Log Input(per worker)
Capital  0.072  -0.038  0.017
(0.70)  (0.20)  (0.10)
Human Capital  -0.151  0.992  0.569
(1.39)  (6.31)  (3.27)
Electricity  -0.869
(7.47)
Paved Roads  -0.398
(2.98)
Capital Squared  0.026  0.034  0.027
(3.57)  (3.50)  (2.75)
Human Capital Squared  -0.064  -0.114  -0.062
(5.78)  (5.76)  (2.92)
Electricity Squared  -0.061
(10.9)
Paved Roads Squared  -0.054
(6.36)
Capital*Human Capital  0.049  -0.049  -0.039
(3.81)  (3.13)  (1.89)
Capital*Electricity  0.069
(6.07)
Capital*Paved Roads  0.044
(2.87)





R squared adjusted  0.993  0.995  0.996
N  2674  2473  1671
Countries  97  90  67
Number of Short Run  582  810  603
Parameters
36Table 4. Elasticity of Output
Regression  Elasticity of Output  Inputs Per Worker in 1985
No.  with Respect to  Lower Quartile  Median  Upper Quartile
(1)  capital  0.50  0.59  0.65
human capital  0.09  0.11  0.11
(2)  capital  0.35  0.52  0.65
human capital  0.08  0.08  0.13
electricity  0.06  0.09  0.07
(3)  capital  0.43  0.52  0.61
human capital  0.14  0.09  0.14
paved roads  0.05  0.09  0.04
37Table  5. Unit Costs of Construction
Paved  Roads,
International  $  per  Electricity  Electricity  International
Infrastructure  units  kilometer  US $  per kilowatt  $ per kilowatt
Year  1985  1989  1985
Algeria  2347  2193
Angola  3400  3257
Argentina  80223  1902  2780
Australia  869154
Austria  506012
Bangladesh  2815  17833
Belgium  402887
Bolivia  180458  1740  3177
Botswana  256089
Brazil  639203  2655  5447
Cameroon  278808
Canada  500760
Central Afr.R.  7786  15407
Chile  143840  1924  4126
China  1502  4695
Colombia  169987  2564  5401
Congo  2429  4934
Costa Rica  131966  2301  4143
Cyprus  2655  3982
Denmark  400378
Dominican  Rep.  253455  1914  4850
Ecuador  366371  2439  4581
Egypt  1590  3498
El  Salvador  540362  3971  7127
Ethiopia  712160  2689  6128
Fiji  2923  4924
Finland  477889
France  386139
Gambia  1769  3929
Germany,  West  443177
Ghana  2460  3274
Guatemala  631965  4719  6785
Honduras  771088  2144  3006
Hong  Kong  305218
Hungary  159311  3439  7878
India  143306  2061  6504




Ivory Coast  288277  1680  3048
Jamaica  2023  4196
Japan  339714
38Table 5. (continued)
Paved  Roads  Electricity
International  $ per  Electricity  International  $  per
Infrastructure  units  kilometer  US $  per kilowatt  kilowatt
Year  1985  1989  1985
Jordan  1797  2846
Kenya  285128  1717  3779
Korea, Rep.  92072  2990  4651
Lesotho  2918  14928
Liberia  426839
Luxembourg  402887
Madagascar  176712  4882  11174
Malawi  282163  1990  5499
Malaysia  1746  3057
Mali  1957  6145
Mexico  1949  3729
Morocco  270454  2145  6040
Mozambique  6250  15957
Myanmar  2719  7646
Nepal  *4346  22989
Netherlands  529989
New  Zealand  456604
Nicaragua  3229  5280
Niger  7000  14977
Nigeria  2793  2560
Norway  438496
Pakistan  434650  1390  4550
Panama  187551  3417  4423
Papua N.Guinea  1925  3737
Peru  3393  8273
Philippines  111343  2043  4708
Poland  1851  3404
Portugal  236770  2330  4858
Senegal  306742  13600  32856
Sierra Leone  3038  6304
Somalia  3268  5413
Spain  236990
Sri Lanka  65277  4451  19930
Sudan  2422  5293
Sweden  522244
Syria  1539  3458
Tanzania  221723
Thailand  2034  5823
Tunisia  313404  1189  2415




Paved  Roads  Electricity
International  $  per  Electricity  International  $ per
Infrastructure  units.  kilometer  US $per kilowatt  kilowatt
Year  1985  1989  1985
Uruguay  95440  1778  3776
Yugoslavia  1702  3591
Zambia  144577
Zimbabwe  277287  1927  3660
40Table 6. Rates of Return to Electricity Generating Capacity and Capital
Rate of Return  Rate of Return  ROR EGC/
to EGC  to Capital  ROR K
Algeria  0.63  0.15  4.20
Argentina  0.46  0.29  1.59
Bangladesh  0.61  0.80  0.77
Bolivia  0.92  0.19  4.74
Brazil  0.10  0.58  0.16
Central Afr.R.  0.40  0.12  3.25
Chile  0.41  0.73  0.56
China  0.54  0.41  1.31
Colombia  0.28  0.55  0.50
Congo  1.14  0.25  4.58
Costa Rica  0.25  0.36  0.69
Cyprus  0.36  0.31  1.19
Dominican Rep.  0.25  0.61  0.42
Ecuador  0.45  0.50  0.91
Egypt  0.45  0.50  0.90
El Salvador  0.17  0.42  0.40
Fiji  0.32  0.30  1.06
Gambia  1.05  0.23  4.49
Ghana  0.25  0.18  1.37
Guatemala  0.18  0.34  0.52
Honduras  0.95  0.27  3.56
India  0.24  0.53  0.44
Indonesia  1.06  0.62  1.70
Jamaica  0.11  0.20  0.54
Jordan  0.40  0.42  0.96
Kenya  1.25  0.19  6.63
Korea, Rep.  0.31  0.45  0.68
Malawi  0.54  0.18  3.00
Malaysia  0.77  0.44  1.76
Mali  0.51  0.24  2.16
Mexico  0.51  0.52  0.98
Mozambique  -0.07  0.17  -0.42
Myanmar  0.34  0.33  1.03
Nepal  0.40  0.56  0.72
Nicaragua  0.20  0.30  0.67
Niger  0.12  0.13  0.92
Pakistan  0.18  0.95  0.19
Panama  0.21  0.38  0.55
Papua N.Guinea  0.06  0.24  0.26
Peru  0.21  0.40  0.51
Philippines  0.44  0.35  1.25
Portugal  0.07  0.46  0.14
41Senegal  0.06  0.24  0.27
Sri Lanka  0.27  0.86  0.31
Syria  0.35  0.80  0.44
Thailand  0.42  0.61  0.69
Tunisia  0.40  0.37  1.07
Turkey  0.32  0.72  0.45
Uganda  0.80  0.02  46.26
Uruguay  0.30  0.51  0.59
Yugoslavia  0.24  0.34  0.72
Zimbabwe  0.05  0.38  0.14
42Table 7. Rates of Return to Paved Roads
Rate of Return  Rate of Return  ROR Paved Roads/
to Paved  Roads  to Capital  ROR Capital
Argentina  3.85  0.29  13.33
Australia  -0.01  0.30  -0.02
Austria  0.00  0.29  -0.02
Belgium  0.06  0.40  0.14
Bolivia  7.96  0.21  37.09
Botswana  0.20  0.58  0.34
Brazil  0.61  0.57  1.07
Cameroon  1.88  0.35  5.31
Chile  5.24  0.73  7.15
Colombia  9.47  0.54  17.53
Costa Rica  1.96  0.37  5.24
Denmark  0.12  0.30  0.40
Ecuador  1.97  0.51  3.85
El Salvador  1.11  0.47  2.38
Finland  0.15  0.22  0.68
Germany,  West  0.16  0.29  0.55
Guatemala  0.76  0.38  2.01
Honduras  0.39  0.34  1.15
India  0.74  0.78  0.96
Indonesia  2.03  0.83  2.45
Ireland  0.06  0.36  0.15
Italy  0.26  0.34  0.76
Japan  0.62  0.20  3.05
Kenya  0.53  0.35  1.51
Korea,  Rep.  15.76  0.43  36.95
Liberia  1.04  0.15  6.82
Malawi  0.60  0.40  1.50
Netherlands  0.15  0.32  0.46
New Zealand  0.08  0.36  0.23
Norway  0.02  0.21  0.08
Pakistan  0.52  1.17  0.45
Panama  2.18  0.38  5.76
Philippines  7.19  0.40  17.99
Senegal  0.48  0.45  1.07
Sweden  0.06  0.29  0.21
Tunisia  0.16  0.43  0.36
Turkey  1.58  0.78  2.03
U.K.  0.13  0.39  0.32
U.S.A.  0.07  0.29  0.26
Zambia  0.65  0.24  2.69
Zimbabwe  0.15  0.45  0.33
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